In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:360 HUME'S NATURALI Z EP PHILOSOPHY In "Epistemology Naturalized," Quine claimed that the failure of reductive-foundationalist attempts in epistemology, after the model of Carnap' s Aufbau, must lead to a redefinition of epistemology's task. Instead of setting out to reconstruct the whole fabric of our knowledge from absolute data through deductive operations, we should investigate how human subjects derive their knowledge of nature from sensory inputs. Thus epistemology is (...) to be conceived as a branch of natural science, cognate with psychology, not as the study of the foundations of science any more. In the present paper, I will first outline Quine's position and his related interpretation of Hume's philosophical enterprise. Then, I will try to assess the relevance and fairness of Quine's account and consider in what measure it allows us to understand the novelty of Hume's conception of philosophy, since Hume also advocated a nonfoundationalist conception of philosophy which bears some striking analogy to naturalized epistemology. Finally, I will suggest which consequences are to be drawn from this unusual view of Hume, especially as regards the self-reference of philosophy. Quine's position in the matter of epistemology is well known. For him, under its traditional form and program, epistemology used to deal with the foundations of science, be it mathematics or the science of nature. This foundationalist approach had two connected aspects, one which Quine calls conceptual; the other he calls doctrinal. As Quine 361 puts it "the conceptual studies are concerned with clarifying concepts by defining them, some in terms of others" (Quine, p. 69). In the same manner, the doctrinal studies attempt to establish laws "by proving them, some on the basis of others" (Quine, p. 69). Derivative concepts will be defined in terms of the clearer ones and complex laws will be proved from primitive and obvious ones. Thus the traditional or classical conception of epistemology involves simultaneously a theory of concepts or meanings and a theory of truth. These two branches (Quine speaks of a duality of structure or bifurcation) converge so as to provide an analysis of the way our knowledge of nature -- and our knowledge in general — stems from and is built upon our sensory experience which validates it. In so characterizing epistemology, Quine simply restates in his own terms the f oundationalist and reductivist program of positivist epistemology, which itself tied in with the logicist program in mathematics. Then Quine suggests that Hume dealt with both sides of this program, the conceptual and the doctrinal. To begin with, Hume developed what might be called a theory of concepts or meanings in terms of our sensory data. Such is the point of his theory of ideas which consists in tracing them back to the original impressions they are derived from. In spite of its limitations, which hinge on the lack of an approach in terms of statements, Hume's phenomenalism does the job of a theory of meaning and concepts. Hume also attempted to give an answer to the question of the truth of our knowledge. In this case again, his phenomenalist stand allows him to account for the truth of our singular statements concerning our perceptions, even though this result is achieved at the cost of identifying objects and sensory data. 362 However, when Hume comes to general statements and singular statements concerning future events, his attempt fails. This is not surprising. According to Quine, if it were possible to improve on Hume's theory of meaning and concepts, especially through the use of contextual definition techniques, by contrast, all the attempts to logically derive the truth of our knowledge from true premises have failed. In matter of induction, we are not one step further than Hume was. "The most modest of generalizations about observable traits will cover more cases than its utterer can have had occasions actually to observe. The hopelessness of grounding natural science upon immediate experience in a firmly logical way was acknowledged" (Quine, p. 74). Or "the Humean predicament is the human predicament." For Quine, foundationalist attempts of the sort Hume engaged in involve two cardinal principles of empiricism which remain unchallenged. One of these principles is to the effect... (shrink)

A novel and versatile polarization-entanglement scheme is adopted to investigate the violation of the EPR local realism for a non-maximally entangled two-photon system according to the recent nonlocality proof by Lucien Hardy. In this context the adoption of a sophisticated detection method allows direct determination of any element of physical reality (viz., determined with probability equal to unity in the words of Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen) for the pair system within complete measurements that are largely insensitive to the detector (...) quantum-efficiencies and noise. (shrink)

A novel and versatile polarization-entanglement scheme is adopted to investigate the violation of the EPR local realism for a non-maximally entangled two-photon system according to the recent “nonlocality proof” by Lucien Hardy. In this context the adoption of a sophisticated detection method allows direct determination of any “element of physical reality” (viz., determined “with probability equal to unity” in the words of Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen) for the pair system within complete measurements that are largely insensitive to the detector (...) quantum-efficiencies and noise. (shrink)

De quoi sont faits un Etat et un droit étatique? Quelle place occupent-ils par rapport à la société où ils sont institués? Pour le comprendre, il est utile de mettre au jour une parenté qui existe entre le droit étatique et d'autres phénomènes, parenté plus ou moins voilée par le discours officiel. A cette fin, l'auteur s'attache à dégager un élément commun : le jurème, matériau de base, particule élémentaire, dont il analyse minutieusement les diverses positions, transformations et combinaisons. L'originalité (...) de l'ouvrage est dans cette manière analytique d'aborder des questions que la philosophie et la sociologie du droit traitent le plus souvent en partant d'une vision d'ensemble de réalités complexes. La méthode suivie se caractérise aussi par le souci constant d'isoler et de mettre en évidence ce qui, dans l'expression du droit, tend presque inévitablement à son apologie, par le refus du préjugé selon lequel la notion de droit s'opposerait irréductiblement à la notion de fait et par une distinction radicale de l'être et du devoir être, de la règle en vigueur et de la règle juste. (shrink)

Debates over the causes and consequences of the “Axial Age” – and its relevance for understanding and explaining “modernity” – continue to rage within and across a wide variety of academic disciplines, including anthropology, sociology, archaeology, history, social theory, and cognitive science. We present a computational model that synthesizes three leading theories about the emergence of axial civilizations. Although these theories are often treated as competitors, our computational model shows how their most important conceptual insights and empirically based causal claims (...) can be integrated within a single computational architecture. The plausibility of the latter is supported by the results of our simulation experiments, which were able to simulate the emergence and growth of an axial civilization. The model shows how the relevant theories can be rendered consistent, while challenging the claims of any one to comprehensiveness. (shrink)

This paper, accessible for a general philosophical audience having only some fleeting acquaintance with set-theory and category-theory, concerns the philosophy of mathematics, specifically the bearing of category-theory on the foundations of mathematics. We argue for six claims. (I) A founding theory for category-theory based on the primitive concept of a set or a class is worthwile to pursue. (II) The extant set-theoretical founding theories for category-theory are conceptually flawed. (III) The conceptual distinction between a set and a class can be (...) seen to be formally codified in Ackermann's axiomatisation of set-theory. (IV) A slight but significant deductive extension of Ackermann's theory of sets and classes founds Cantorian set-theory as well as category-theory, and therefore can pass as a founding theory of the whole of mathematics. (V) The extended theory does not suffer from the conceptual flaws of the extant set-theoretical founding theories. (VI) The extended theory is not only conceptually but also logically superior to the competing set-theories because its consistency can be proved on the basis of weaker assumptions than the consistency of the competition. (shrink)

Part I Introduction -/- Passion at a Distance (Don Howard) -/- Part II Philosophy, Methodology and History -/- Balancing Necessity and Fallibilism: Charles Sanders Peirce on the Status of Mathematics and its Intersection with the Inquiry into Nature (Ronald Anderson) -/- Newton’s Methodology (William Harper) -/- Whitehead’s Philosophy and Quantum Mechanics (QM): A Tribute to Abner Shimony (Shimon Malin) -/- Bohr and the Photon (John Stachel) -/- Part III Bell’s Theorem and Nonlocality A. Theory -/- Extending the Concept of an (...) “Element of Reality” to Work with Inefficient Detectors (Daniel M. Greenberger) -/- A General Proof of Nonlocality without Inequalities for Bipartite States (GianCarlo Ghirardi and Luca Marinatto) -/- On the Separability of Physical Systems (Jon P. Jarrett) -/- Bell Inequalities: Many Questions, a Few Answers (Nicolas Gisin) -/- B. Experiment -/- Do Experimental Violations of Bell Inequalities Require a Nonlocal Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics? II: Analysis a la Bell (Edward S. Fry, Xinmei Qu, and Marlan O. Scully) -/- The Physics of 2 = 1 + 1 (Yanhua Shih) -/- Part IV Probability, Uncertainty, and Stochastic Modifications of Quantum Mechanics -/- Interpretations of Probability in Quantum Mechanics: A Case of “Experimental Metaphysics” (Geoffrey Hellman) -/- “No Information Without Disturbance”: Quantum Limitations of Measurement (Paul Busch) -/- How Stands Collapse II (Philip Pearle) -/- Is There a Relation Between the Breakdown of the Superposition Principle and an Indeterminacy in the Structure of the Einsteinian Space-Time? (Andor Frenkel) -/- Indistinguishability or Stochastic Dependence? (D. Costantini and U. Garibaldi) -/- Part V Relativity -/- Plane Geometry in Spacetime (N. David Mermin) -/- The Transient nows (Steven F. Savitt) -/- Quantum in Gravity? (Michael Horne) -/- A Proposed Test of the Local Causality of Spacetime (Adrian Kent) -/- Quantum Gravity Computers: On the Theory of Computation with Indefinite Causal Structure (Lucien Hardy) -/- “Definability,” “Conventionality,” and Simultaneity in Einstein–Minkowski Space-Time (Howard Stein) -/- Part VI Concluding Words -/- Bistro Banter: A Dialogue with Abner Shimony and Lee Smolin -/- Unfinished Work: A Bequest (Abner Shimony) -/- Bibliography of Abner Shimony. (shrink)

Philosophy of history is the Cinderella of contemporary philosophy. Philosophers rarely believe that the issues dealt with by philosophers of history are matters of any great theoretical interest or urgency. In their view philosophy of history rarely goes beyond the question of how results that have already been achieved elsewhere can or should be applied to the domain of historical writing. Moreover, contemporary philosophers of history have done desperately little to dispel the low opinion that their colleagues have of them. (...) In this essay I argue that Arthur Danto is the exception confirming the rule, for Danto’s philosophy of representation may help us understand how texts relate to what they are about. The main shortcoming of philosophy of language undoubtedly is that it never bothered to investigate the philosophical mysteries of the text. The writing of history is a philosophical goldmine and we must praise Danto for having reminded us of this. (shrink)

In responding to Ms Rowell’s commentary on her original paper the author points out that the job of all bioethicists, namely, speaking truth to power, is a daunting task which is unlikely to succeed “if we do not learn to ask for and to accept, to offer and to provide, moral support and meaningful help.”In my article “The Olivieri debacle: where were the heroes of bioethics?”1 I make four comments about Ms Rowell’s involvement in the case. In my first comment (...) relating to Ms Rowell, I suggest that a careful reader of the Naimark report could reasonably conclude “that the role of bioethics in helping to resolve the controversy was, at best, very limited”. In reaching this conclusion, I relied on the findings of the two official reports/inquiries about this case. Though the two reports reach different conclusions about the case, there appears to be agreement on the very limited role of bioethics. As noted in my original article, in the 160 page Naimark report there are but a few paragraphs about bioethics and Ms Rowell’s role in the Olivieri case. This is surprising, and I say as much in my article. In the 540 page report of the Committee of Inquiry, which Ms Rowell describes as “a review that I believe to provide a public report of integrity”, little more detail is provided regarding Ms Rowell’s role. I included all references to Ms Rowell from the first report in the original article. I did not do so with the second report. This was not done to diminish any contribution Ms Rowell might have made. In my view, no new evidence germane to the points I wanted to make was provided in the text that I did not include in my article.In …. (shrink)

Cet article explore le moment où le thème de la formation professionnelle des femmes, longtemps négligé, s’invite dans le débat public sous la pression d’organisations internationales et nationales. À partir d’un corpus de documentaires et reportages filmés diffusés à la télévision française entre 1958 et 1973 et de différents fonds d’archives, il analyse l’émergence d’une figure de femme en formation professionnelle féminine, celle d’une femme au foyer souhaitant (re)trouver un travail après une longue interruption pour raison familiale. Cette figure en (...) vient à éclipser toute autre image, notamment celle de la salariée en formation. Les documents filmés sont pris ici comme des révélateurs des manières de penser la formation et son public dans une période de transition historique, celle d’une remise en question des rôles socio-sexuels en particulier vis-à-vis du travail. (shrink)

Much of Essler''s work has been devoted to bringing science andphilosophy together for the purpose of conceptual clarification. Oneparticularly interesting area for such cooperation between science andphilosophy has been relativity theory. In this paper I will consider oneinstance of such interplay: the transformation that our notions of rotationand rigidity have undergone in general relativity and what this process canteach us. I will start by saying a little about the physics of the situation andthen go on to some philosophical observations about (...) meaning and theory. (shrink)

This paper discusses the important paper by Paul Thagard on the pathway version of mechanistic explanation that is currently used in chemical explanation. The author claims that this method of explanation has a respectable pedigree and can be traced back to the Chemical Revolution in the arguments used by the Lavoisier School in their theoretical duels with Richard Kirwan, the proponent of a revised phlogistonian theory. Kirwan believed that complex chemical reactions could be explained by recourse to affinity tables that (...) catalogued the attraction that various simple bodies possessed towards each other. To explain was in effect to make a delayed prediction, it is not enough just to show how a phenomenon fits into the discernible patterns of the world. Lavoisier, Fourcroy and their colleagues used pathway reasoning, although disguising this fact by suggesting that affinities varied when subjected to n-body situations. (shrink)

This article explores the relationship between utility and justice in the ancient Epicurean tradition, and as it developed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries following the revival of Epicureanism in the writings of Pierre Gassendi. It focuses on the significance of various allusions to a line from Horace, ‘utilitas, justi prope mater et aequi’, which appeared in writings of Hugo Grotius, David Hume, and Jeremy Bentham, and was used to give utility a prominence in modern hought that it had not (...) hitherto received. The article attempts to provide the context for Hume’s belief in the Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals that the foundation of justice was utility and for Bentham placing utility at the foundation of his system. (shrink)